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Abstract  
 
During the onset of outbreak of crisis 2012, the European Union (EU) launched a 
foreign policy mission in Mali with the stated aim of providing long-term 
development and stability in the country. The encompassing mission is underpinned 
by the understanding that development and security are mutually dependent and 
reinforcing, commonly referred to as the security-development nexus. The stated 
connection between the two is also associated with the promotion of liberal peace, in 
which Western actors forcibly attempts to transform societies into liberal democracies 
conducive to open market economies. The EU presents its involvement as beneficial 
for Mali and its citizens thus evoking an image of the EU actins as a force for good, 
yet a closer scrutiny of the official discourse and practices tell another story. Rather, 
in this article I argue that the EU is promoting a development project in Mali that is 
mostly beneficial for the union itself.  By using a discourse analysis of EU 
documents, complemented by an analysis of secondary sources covering the facts on 
the ground, I further argue that the EU uses the concepts of ‘partnership’ and 
‘ownership’ as code words to condition the kind of development it has in mind for 
Mali that also justifies a selective engagement.  In practice, this has manifested itself 
in the bunkerization of its aid agencies. I conclude that the EU ultimately presents a 
development project that values the enactment of EU’s security interests over 
development promotion for Mali and Malians.  
 
Keywords: European Union, Mali, security-development nexus, liberal peace, 
partnership, ownership, bunkerization of aid 
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Introduction 
During the onset of the outbreak of a constitutional crisis in Mali 2012, the European 
Union (EU) launched an encompassing mission with the stated aim of providing long-
term development and stability in the country. The belief that development and 
security are intrinsically linked and can only be achieved together, known as the 
security-development nexus, serves as basis and guiding principle for the EU 
engagement in Mali. Security and development practices have in this manner become 
increasingly blurred and presented as interchangeable which in turn is also connected 
to the project of liberal peace, whereby Western actors aim to forcibly transform 
societies on the basis of liberal democracy and market economies. The EU 
emphasizes its commitment to provide sustainable development for Mali and presents 
their engagement as benefitting the country and its people since it will lead to stability 
and peace, yet the engagement is in practice more geared towards the enactment of 
security interests, which benefits mostly the EU. This is puzzling considering the 
prevalence ‘sustainable development’ is given in the justification of the EU 
engagement and as such it gives rise to the question of what kind of development 
project can be discerned from the EU mission in Mali?  Through an analysis of the 
discourse and the practices on the ground, I argue that the EU is presenting a 
development project for Mali in which the EU is indispensable and prone to act on its 
security interests rather than provide development for Mali and its citizens. This 
contradicts with what the EU claims that they are doing in Mali and it questions the 
notion of the EU acting as a force for good.  
 The far-reaching mission consists of several tenets. Of primary importance in 
this article are the Sahel Strategy from 2011 and its updated version the Regional 
Action Plan from 2015, since they constitute the overall framework that guides all EU 
activities in Mali. They have the same overall goal of providing stability and 
development for the Sahel states, yet the latter has a more explicit focus on security 
issues and counter-terrorism practices (EEAS 2016).  Additional sources include a 
speech made by then-president of the European Council, Herman von Rompuy in 
May 2013, since it addressed the topic of development to Mali in a high-level donor 
conference and specified how the EU perceived the situation and presented solutions. 
Apart from the two strategies, the EU has also deployed a Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) missions that focus specifically on Mali, a training mission 
for the Malian armed forces (EUTM) in 2013. The factsheet on the mission will also 
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be considered as part of the EU discourse since it stipulates the EU’s short to mid-
term objectives in their overall strategy.  Finally, council conclusions from 2012-2016 
have also been included as part of the data since they have addressed the EU 
engagement in Mali. 
 The article is organised as follows. It begins with the background and object 
of study, which focuses on the constitutional crisis that unfolded in Mali and which 
changed the nature and intensity of the EU engagement. This is followed by a 
literature review that covers the foreign policy role of the EU before it proceeds with 
the theoretical framework of the security-development nexus and the concepts that 
will be used. The main part is divided into three sections, which respectively 
addresses how the EU justifies the engagement, how it acts on security responses and 
how its development engagement can be characterized. The article finishes with a 
conclusion that summarizes the main findings and suggests how this may be useful 
for further research. 
 
Background and Object of Analysis 
Since the mid 1990’s considerable tensions had existed between Tuareg groups in the 
north of Mali and the government in the southern capital Bamako over issues 
concerning the economic development and autonomy of the north. Several peace 
agreement were made in which the Malian government committed to better integrate 
the northern parts by means of increased welfare policies, greater sub-national 
autonomy and the creation of a special Tuareg security unit to police the area, but 
they were never fully implemented. The failure to adhere to these agreements led in 
turn to a deterioration of the security situation and ensuing armed conflict between the 
north and the south in January 2012 (Raleigh and Dowd 2013:11). The fall of the 
Gaddafi regime in 2011 is also significant as many Tuareg fighters made their way 
back to their homeland and rekindled the conflict. After initial attacks in 2012 the 
separatist movement MNLA (Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad) joined 
forces with jihadist groups and eventually took over the north. In the wake of a coup 
d’état it seemed like the groups would “invade” the capital in January 2013 at which 
time the French intervened on the request by the interim Malian president (Andersson 
and Weigand 2015:526-527). 
 It is within this context that the EU changed the nature of its engagement in 
Mali and increased their activities in the country from 2011 and onwards. Notably, 
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prior to the outbreak of crisis the EU had been involved in Mali for a long time but 
was primarily conceived as an aid donor focused on managing technical development 
aid programmes (Davis 2015:278). During the crisis, the EU emerged as a much more 
political and security-oriented actor, which is particularly clear in the Regional Action 
Plan from 2015, but which can also be seen in the deployment of their military 
presence in the form of the EUTM. The overall aim to provide development for Mali 
has remained the same throughout EU’s engagement, but the responses to the crisis 
has also been developed within a counter-terrorism framework. The empirics I intend 
to use have already been mentioned in the introduction, but I have chosen the 
timeframe of 2011-2016 for the EU documents because these were written during the 
years which the EU involvement changed character. As such, the documents are 
informative in telling what development project can be discerned, since the promotion 
of sustainable development and stability remains the goal even when though the EU 
has also presented an increased security focus from 2015 onwards.  
 
Literature Review: the Foreign Policy Role of the EU  
A common way of describing the foreign policy role of the EU in international 
relations is in terms of normative power. The general idea is that the EU differs 
significantly from other forms of powers that are more coercive in character. Rather, 
the EU promotes foreign- and development policies conducive to contributing global 
peace and stability, thus acting as a force for good in the world. Ian Manners (2002) is 
an ardent advocate of the label ‘Normative Power Europe’ and argues that there is 
something normatively distinct about the EU, whereby the promotion of norms like 
peace, liberty, rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights is the main feature 
of its foreign policy (2002:235). Accordingly, the EU has the ability to project these 
norms and will readily do so in both the promotion of development and in the 
enactment of security issues, which is part and parcel of what makes the EU a ‘force 
for good’ in the world (Manners 2002:238).  
The perception of the EU as a normative power is however contested and has 
been criticised for various reasons. Part of the literature has addressed the notion of 
the EU as a normative power with regards to its role as a security actor. In analysing 
the narrative of the EU in the European Security Strategy, Maria Stern (2011) argue 
that the foreign policy objectives and security interests of the EU are based on 
differences between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Specifically, notions of ‘otherness’ help 
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inform what, or who, is seen as threatening for the EU and these are imbued with 
gendered and racialised meaning that ultimately presents the EU as superior 
(2011:31). Stern focuses on the security identity that is being produced in the 
document, but this has implications for the foreign policy and forms of development 
that the EU promotes globally and it questions the self-presentation of the EU as force 
for good. The primary reason for this is that the narrative in the document serves to 
further divide the world into sharp spacial- and temporal distinctions, where some 
regions are described as underdeveloped in contrast to Europe and where its foreign 
policy conducts in both security and development matters legitimised because it is in 
the name of security.  
Another strand of the literature pays attention to the relation between the 
promotion of norms and the pursuit of strategic interests. Among the critics, Thomas 
Diez (2005; 2013) argues that it is dubious whether the EU can be described as a 
normative power since it is difficult to distinguish between norms and interests in 
practice. The promotion of norms is usually expressed in “universal” terms, which 
masks the short-term focus of EU’s self-interest. Moreover, the norms prescribed as 
central to the concept of “normative power Europe” can also be used as a means to 
achieve interests connected with power, similar to ways in which military and 
economic means can be used as instruments (Diez 2005: 615-616). In a similar line of 
argument, Jan Zielonka (2013) claims that the normative discourse of the EU is 
usually seen as the actor promoting certain norms and values but it is also used as a 
device to legitimize its policies in its neighbourhood.  
The EU foreign policy mission in Mali has also been addressed, specifically 
with regards to security issues. There is a group of scholars who claim that the EU has 
launched a set of strategies in Mali because it is in a position where it can take a 
leading role in the region. This is related to an image of the EU as both a forceful and 
legitimate actor, which in turn enables the EU to act on strategic interests by 
promoting security in Mali  (Boukhars 2013; Marchal 2012; del Sarto and Tholens 
2013). Others argue that security issues are the sole motivator behind the involvement 
and that EU’s concern with its image is at best secondary. Rather, the involvement is 
connected to the “Global War on Terror”, since domestic groups have linkages with 
Al-Qaeda groups which started to alarm the international community (Bøås and 
Torheim 2013; Wing, 2013). 
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Consequently, the foreign policy role and objectives of the EU has been 
subject to extensive study and noteworthy criticism. The perception of the EU as a 
normative power and force for good has been questioned on different accounts, but 
the primary focus has been on how the EU promotes its foreign policy with regards to 
security enactments and interests. While forms of development are implicit in the 
foreign policy of the EU, how the promotion of development relates to security policy 
has not been the primary focus.  This brings us to the theory of the security-
development nexus. Similar to the literature mentioned above, the theory offers means 
to question the term normative power through different concepts, but it also points to 
an answer considering the foreign policy and development projects of the EU.  
  
Theoretical Framework: The Security-Development Nexus 
The security-development nexus refers to the perception that development and 
security are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforcing. As such, the promotion of 
development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security and security is seen 
as a prerequisite for sustainable development. The stated linkage between the two has 
become commonplace within the realm of predominantly Western foreign policy-
making, which has both political and structural implications. According to Mark 
Duffield (2001) the manner in which the nexus is presented reflects a new mode of 
liberal intervention whereby Western actors aim to forcibly transform entire societies 
in the ‘underdeveloped world’.  More importantly, the use of the security-
development nexus in this way explains what constitutes a security threat and where it 
is located, it prescribes what the solution to the threat is and it stipulates who can do 
what in the name of security and development. 
The notion that ‘underdevelopment is dangerous’ signifies the emergence of a 
new security framework for actors in the West. It represents the shift of focus from 
traditional inter-state warfare to the fear of underdevelopment and poverty as a source 
of conflict, criminalised activity and international instability (Duffield 2001:7). Put 
simply, underdevelopment becomes a global security threat that risks destabilising the 
world order and which requires prompt actions in order to resolve this problem. 
Additionally, the causes of conflict are presented as internal in nature and can be 
traced to the modalities of underdevelopment and its associated pathologies of crime 
and terrorism. This understanding reflects a developmental position and 
understanding that is shared by Western policy-makers and aid donors.  The result is 
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that development aid has become radicalized and geared towards modes of conflict 
prevention (Duffield 2001:114-121). Significantly, the notion that poverty and 
underdevelopment is destabilising for actors in the ‘developed world’ provides 
justification for involvement and it catalyses change in the underdeveloped societies 
(Duffield 2001:28). 
Furthermore, besides pointing out what the problem is, namely 
underdevelopment as a risk to global security, Western actors also stipulate what 
should be done and how development should unfold. The concept of ‘liberal peace’ is 
significant in this respect. Specifically, it represents the idea that ‘undeveloped’ and 
therefore dangerous, societies can be transformed to fit into a liberal model of 
development whatever the realities on the ground are. It is the embodiment of a new 
political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on conflict resolution and prevention, 
strengthening of civil institutions, the promotion of rule of law and security sector 
reform in the context of a functioning market economy (Duffield 2001:10-11). In so 
doing, development and liberalism are seen as different but interconnected, and 
development becomes a technology of security (Duffield 2010:54-55). Ultimately, 
Duffield stresses that the promotion of liberal peace is something that brings 
damaging consequences for actors in the underdeveloped world. This is because it 
reflects the existing consensus that conflict in these societies are best approached 
through a number of connected and transformational measures, in which states and 
people within them are expected to change their behaviour and attitudes in order to 
meet prescribed standards of what constitute stable and peaceful societies.   
A distinguishing feature of the security-development nexus, as well as the 
promotion of project of liberal peace, is that it is informed by a power relation that 
works through both exclusionary and inclusionary logics. More to the point how the 
security-development nexus is presented and subsequently manifested in practice is in 
itself geared towards exclusion and is based on differences that serve to further 
distance the developed world from the underdeveloped. Meaning, the causes for the 
problem of underdevelopment are internalised, which make it exclusionary, but the 
threat of underdevelopment as well as the solution to it is presented as a common 
goal, which make it inclusionary (Duffield 2001:7-8). Specifically, the goal of 
securing stability by promoting a development in line with liberal peace is done 
through the developmental principles of partnership, participation and self-
management. As such, underdeveloped societies are no longer order about what to but 
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are expected to do it willingly themselves. Power is implicit in the relationship, but it 
is much more nuanced, opaque and complex in this form. Logics of exclusion and 
inclusion work simultaneously, whereby actors in the underdeveloped states need to 
show themselves fit for consideration by meeting defined standards of behaviour and 
normative expectations in order to receive development support (Duffield 2001:7-8). 
Importantly, when Western actors refer to instances of partnership and participation it 
implies the mutual acceptance of shared normative standards and frameworks. 
Consequently, the project of liberal peace is geared towards conditional and selective 
engagement that is more likely to benefit actors in the West (Duffield 2001:34) 
The issue of responsibility is also important with regard to the security-
development nexus, as it stipulates who should do what. David Chandler (2007) 
argues that the Western policy behind the security-development nexus reflects a 
retreat from strategic policy-making and a transformation into a more inward-looking 
approach more concerned with self-image than the policy consequences in the areas 
affected by insecurity and underdevelopment (Chandler 2007:362). Rather than being 
a shared agenda shaped by the nexus, Chandler suggests that policy discussions 
around the issue reveal a lack of Western policy focus and a disconnection between 
rhetoric and practice.  A consequence of this new approach is that there is a crisis in 
policy-making, whereby policy actors seek to evade any engagement with adequately 
dealing with issues of security and development by shifting responsibility for 
development to other actors (Chandler 2007: 364-369). It is related to the idea that 
while the root causes of underdevelopment and poverty are derived from the 
underdeveloped societies themselves, they also constitute a security threat for 
everyone. This in turn justifies intervention, while at the same time responsibility to 
handle development issues are placed on actors in the ‘underdeveloped societies’ 
(Duffield 2001:28). Put differently, the enactment of Western policies based on the 
security-development nexus can both justify international interventions but it can also 
justify a means of distancing and not taking responsibility, as the causes are made 
internal.  
The main point to be derived from the theory and arguments by Duffield and 
Chandler is that a complex power relation that is ultimately geared towards exclusion 
imbues the use and presentation of the security-development nexus in foreign-policy 
making. This has two consequences. First, the blurring of security and development 
allows acting on security while promoting a specific kind of development, which is in 
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line with liberal peace and neoliberal values. Second, it justifies external intervention 
in underdeveloped societies whilst it also legitimises a form of distancing on behalf of 
Western actors, since responsibility for implementing development changes are 
placed on domestic actors. It is on the basis of this that I make my argument, which is 
that the EU is promoting a development project in Mali that is more beneficial for the 
EU, in that they can act on its security interests whilst simultaneously condition the 
development that should unfold in Mali.   
 
Concepts and Operationalization 
The concepts I will use in this article are ‘partnership’, ‘ownership and ‘bunkerization 
of aid’ and ‘remote management’, since they all reflect the promotion of liberal peace 
and the logics of exclusion and inclusion that underpins it. Partnership and ownership 
are connected to one another in that the goal of transforming underdeveloped and 
dangerous societies is presented as both a mutual security threat to be addressed co-
jointly in partnership and a development issue under sole responsibility and 
ownership for actors in the ‘underdeveloped’ world. Seen as such, the two concepts 
can be read as code words that are imposed by Western actors but presented as being 
a shared common goal of transforming into market economies in order to achieve 
security and development (Duffield 2001:5). By evaluating short-term and long-term 
objectives of the strategies that make up the EU mission, I will examine when the EU 
presents an issue as being a shared objective with EU and the state of Mali and when 
the EU presents an issue as being under the ownership of Mali. For the former, this 
includes references to the words  ‘we’, ‘our’, ‘shared’ and ‘mutual’ and words to that 
extent. For the latter, it includes references to ‘responsibility’ and ‘resilience’, 
especially if these are written in combination with  ‘their’ and ‘its’.  
 ‘Bunkerization of aid’ represents a different manifestation of the liberal peace 
project. It implies that liberal frontiers are collapsing, which the West tries to manage 
locally by bunkerization. Characteristics include remote management on the part of 
aid donors, as well as security measures undertaken by aid agencies like the 
establishment of  ‘safe zones’, the constructing high walls and use of razor wire 
(Duffield 2012:477). The bunkerization of aid reflects current practices on the ground, 
and the operationalization for this has been derived from academic articles that have 
conducted fieldwork in Mali and used the same definition of ‘bunkerization of aid’. 
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Method: Sociological Discourse Analysis and Data Generation 
In order to conduct the operationalization and analyse the EU documents, I will 
primarily use a sociological discourse analysis to analyse the narrative and see what 
project of development can be discerned concerning the Mali engagement. A 
discourse analysis is the most useful in this respect, since it uncovers how something 
is being said and constructed in a given text. A sociological discourse is understood as 
means of understanding social reality, based on the subjective orientation of social 
action (Ruiz 2009:2). An added advantage with this kind of discourse is that it 
emphasises ideology and power in relation to the discourse. As such, it takes into 
consideration how social discourses are imbued by dominant discourses projected 
from sources of power (Ruiz 2009:10). The subject’s particular viewpoint and 
discourse is understood to mirror mechanisms of ideological domination. The analysis 
consists of different dimensions: identifying themes and topics of the discourse, 
identifying discursive strategies used to portray certain worldviews and how verbal or 
written means are used to enforce arguments in the discourse (Reisigl and Wodak 
2009:73). In addition, I will also complement the discourse analysis with secondary 
sources in order to support facts and arguments on what the EU is doing on the 
ground in Mali. These sources consists of newspaper articles, reports on human rights 
and development progress, but also academic articles. The reports and academic 
articles that I have chosen to use as secondary sources has been selected because the 
authors have conducted extensive fieldwork and interviews in Mali, both with regards 
to the working environment for aid agencies operating in Mali but also how the 
international diplomatic community perceive the security and development situation 
in Mali following international intervention as a response to the crisis. The secondary 
sources that I will primarily use are an article by Ruben Andersson and Florian 
Weigand (2015) as well as a report by Antonio Donini and Giulia Scalettaris (2016). 
 
 
 
 
Justification for Engagement 
Presentation as Self-Enhancing 
When justifying their involvement in Mali, the EU is mainly presenting a positive 
image of itself on the basis of how it acts in a precarious environment. The notion that 
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underdevelopment is dangerous permeates the understanding of the situation and it is 
presented as it is EU who can provide the solution to the problem and bring forth 
development and stability in Mali. The EU became more actively engaged during the 
onset and immediate aftermath of the constitutional crisis in 2012 and a recurring 
theme in the framework and the related documents is that they evoke a sense of 
urgency that requires immediate action. This is specifically clear in a speech made by 
then-President of the European Council Herman von Rompuy in 2013: 
 
“We are currently at a crossroads in the history of Mali and the Sahel region. 
We must shoulder our responsibilities by tackling all dimensions of the 
problem. […] We need to extend democracy building and dialogue and work 
together to guarantee the development of the region’s commitment. The harsh 
lesson learnt from Malian crisis in the short term is that nothing is possible 
without security”  
(European Council, Speech van Rompuy 15 May 2013:3).  
 
The speech was directed towards the European Council during a donor conference on 
development aid to be allocated to Mali in the aftermath of social unrest in the 
country, and it was co-hosted by the Malian state and van Rompuy. The quotation is 
significant for several reasons. Starting with the word “crossroads” it helps convey a 
message of a dire situation that requires immediate action to be taken if things are not 
to take a turn for the worse.  The constant reference to ‘we’ and ‘work together’ 
would indicate that the EU and Mali share the responsibility of tackling the problem, 
in so doing also presenting it as a form of partnership taking place, which would then 
benefit EU, Mali and the Malian citizens. However, it is questionable what kind of 
partnership is at stake, as it is first and foremost the EU who has a more active role to 
play in ensuring that a stable situation is restored in Mali. It is worthwhile pointing 
out that it is in the responsibility of the EU to ‘extend democracy building’ to 
guarantee the development of the region’s commitment to this form of development. 
The message conveyed is that it is the EU possess agency in this situation and should 
not only lead by example but also be active in implementing this development, which 
are in themselves in line with liberal democratic values.  
 The notion that the EU is in a unique position to pass on solutions and provide 
stability is further expressed in other documents, most notably in the Regional Action 
Plan from 2015, which comes four years after the EU’s initial Sahel Strategy.  In 
explaining the launch of the plan, the following is stated:  
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“[The plan] comes at a crucial time for the countries, [and it] reaffirms the 
EU’s continued engagement and its support to sustainable and inclusive 
political and socioeconomic development, the strengthening of human rights, 
democratic governance and the rule of law as well as resilience.” 
 
(Council of the European Union, 20 April 2015:2)  
 
It is presented as it is the Regional Plan that will ensure stability for the countries in 
the region, as the EU steps in at ‘crucial time’ to continue its involvement and support 
to promote their resilience and development. The EU is seen to be in a position where 
it can pass on the ‘liberal peace’ values of human rights, rule of law and democratic 
governance, which Mali and the other Sahel states supposedly are lacking, as these 
are the values that are conducive to stability and sustainable development. As such, 
the dual functionality of the notion that underdevelopment is dangerous also becomes 
relevant in this respect. Meaning, one the one hand it serves as justification for the EU 
to remain involved in Mali, as underdevelopment brings with it a risk of conflict and 
the EU presence through the promotion of liberal values which will bring forth 
stability (Duffield 2001:122).  On the other hand, the fault of unstable situation is 
attributed to internal root causes and the responsibility to provide a long-term solution 
to it is placed, indirectly, on Malian actors. This sentiment is strengthened further on 
in the Regional Action Plan, when the EU explains the situation in Mali but also 
evaluates its own efforts in handling the situation. First, The EU states that the current 
situation in Mali remains as delicate in 2015, if not more challenging as it was in 
2011, which serves as reason for the renewed engagement:  
  
“Challenges are linked to the extreme poverty, lack of stability including 
economic fragility remain as acute as in 2011. Irregular migration and related 
crimes such as trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, 
corruption, illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime are thriving 
particularly where there is weak and/or little presence of any governmental 
authority”. 
    (Council of the European Union, April 2015:7) 
 
Second, and more significantly, this reasoning becomes more interesting when 
compared to the self-evaluation of its own initiatives and performance in Mali. 
Accordingly: 
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“The engagement of the EU, along with the activities of the Member States, 
has been impressive over the past four years in the Sahel […] There is no 
doubt that the EU has come a long way in addressing the challenges in the 
Sahel, overcoming the existing barriers and been able to ensure 
complementarity between the different EU instruments and missions/EDF as 
well as close coordination with Member States” 
    
(Council of the European Union, April 2015:13) 
       
From the quotations above, the EU involvement and different actions in Mali is 
presented as “impressive”, but at the same time the situation in Mali is the same, 
possibly even more challenging. Seen as such, the EU is distancing itself in that it is 
not their actions in Mali that are faltering: the EU engagement is commendable and 
the union has done what it could, it is the underdeveloped Mali that is source of 
challenges. At the same time, it also justifies their continued engagement since they 
are in a unique position to promote development in line with liberal peace.  
  
Disregard of Alternatives 
Apart from legitimising EU presence, the focus on underdevelopment as dangerous 
also means that the EU dismisses alternative ways of presenting the situation in Mali. 
This is seen in the solutions that the EU put forward, which are predominantly 
devoted to strengthening government capacity in Bamako, but also in what Malian 
actors are considered to be suitable partners for the EU and what domestic actors are 
attributed blame for the instability. First, through its presence and actions the EU aims 
to create a capable and stable Malian state that can itself provide security, stability 
and well-being to its citizens.  The solutions that the EU propose does not only cast 
the EU in a leading role in implementing this development, they are also geared 
towards enhancing state structures and implementing liberal values:   
 
 
“The EU has a special responsibility and will continue to provide support to 
better governance including through public sector modernisation.  Democracy 
and human rights will be promoted, including support to elections, local 
governance and decentralisation. 
   (Council of the European Union April 2015:14-15) 
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[The EU] commitment should take into account development, stability of state 
structures and the protection of civilians. The return to stability will only be 
sustainable through successful reform of governance and justice, areas in 
which the EU is involved with the Malian authorities” 
(Council of the European Union April 2015: 20) 
 
Moreover, the EU claim that this development is under the full ownership of the states 
in the region, although this should be carried out with ‘appropriate partnerships’ with 
the UN, AU, ECOWAS, World Bank and civil society (Council of the European 
Union April 2015: 15). This indicates that the EU lays emphasis on liberal political 
processes and governance through public sector modernisation and elections as a 
solution to the situation, which the Sahelian governments should do in cooperation 
with predominantly international actors.  
The dismissal of alternative ways of presenting the situation is most telling in 
consideration of how the EU portrays groups in the northern regions. Specifically, the 
understanding of underdevelopment as dangerous and its linkages to conflict and 
terrorism is prevalent in all of the documents, and while it is attributed to the state of 
Mali at large, the northern region and groups operating therein are singled out as 
particularly precarious. This is particularly clear in the Regional Action Plan, wherein 
the EU states that while the security situation in the entire Sahel region is extremely 
volatile, it is particularly acute in Northern Mali since it carries with it risks of spill-
over effects (Council of the European Union April 2015:7). Moreover, the EU 
emphasise that terrorism is a security threat that has founds its sanctuary in Northern 
Mali that holds the country in its grip. Apart from condemning these actions, the EU 
solution is to reaffirm its support to Malian state authorities in order to put and end to 
the scourge of terrorism and re-establish peace and stability in the country (Council 
conclusion, 16 March 2015: point 1). Significantly, the extensive focus on terrorist 
threats in the northern regions, as well as the solutions aimed at strengthening state 
structures and governance in Bamako disregard the alternative option that the problem 
in Mali could be political and traced back to decade-long calls for increased autonomy 
and greater share of welfare services and development aid for the northern regions. 
The northern regions have long been subordinated, if not outright neglected, by the 
government in Bamako, which many have pointed out as contributing factor to the 
outbreak of crisis and conflict in 2012 (see Bergamaschi 2013; Charbonneu and Sears 
2014; Davis 2015). State policies and the development aid the Malian state received 
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from international donors, including substantial support from the EU, have according 
to members of diplomatic and donor community been contributing factors to the 
conflict, but this is not recognised by the EU policy documents (Davis 2015:266). 
Rather, the Malian state is made unproblematic in the EU discourse that rather 
privileges unity and apparent consensus fitted to state building and globalizing 
neoliberal political and open market economies (Charbonneu and Sears 2014:207). 
The point is that when the EU present solutions that are almost exclusive aimed at 
enhancing state structures in Bamako, this dismisses the notion that the problem in 
Mali is not necessarily that underdevelopment in the north has resulted in conflict. 
Rather, the problem in Mali could also be presented as a political problem, in which 
decades of misused development aid and government policies have resulted in 
conflict and crisis.  
 Consequently, the understanding that underdevelopment is dangerous 
permeates the EU discourse, which in turn informs what kind of development project 
the EU promotes in Mali. It is a development project in which the EU is indispensable 
and can act as both model to follow and as catalyst to implement the necessary change 
that is in line with liberal values of enhancing democratic governance, the protection 
of human rights, the rule of law and market-oriented economies. The EU uses a 
prescriptive language that stipulates what should be done, who the appropriate 
partners are and where the problems derive from. In so doing, the EU is also 
dismissing alternative ways of presenting the situation in Mali. Notably, the extensive 
focus on underdevelopment as conflict-prone and its stated linkages to terrorism in 
the northern regions dismisses a more political explanation. Additionally, presenting 
the situation in Mali as unstable and threatening not only legitimises the EU presence, 
it also helps explain the security focus of the EU mission, which brings us to the 
following section concerning the security responses and what these can tell with 
regards to what kind of development project can be discerned in the EU mission.    
 
 
 
Security as a Guarantee for Development 
Security for the Common Good 
The enactment of EU’s security interests is presented as going hand in hand with the 
long-term development and stability for Mali. As such, security threats are presented 
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as common threats and when the EU acts on countering them, it is therefore beneficial 
for all. The security profile of the EU engagement has been heightened over time, 
which is seen in the difference between their first strategy, the Sahel Strategy, and its 
updated version the Regional Action Plan. The latter specified the urgent need for 
more specific policies in an enhanced security framework, which was subsequently 
done in the form of the deployment of the CSDP mission EUTM Mali. In explaining 
the mandate of the mission we are told that the situation in Mali is a threat to 
European security:   
 
”The current political, humanitarian and security crisis in Mali creates an 
unacceptable situation for the country, and a grave threat for the region and for 
Europe. The situation increases the threat to the safety of EU citizens in the 
Sahel (hostage-taking, attacks) as well as in Europe, notably through the 
influence of extremists and terrorists networks over the diasporas, training, 
and logistical support from Al Qaida affiliates in the north of Mali. It also 
threatens the EU’s strategic interests, including the security of energy supply 
and the fight against human and drugs trafficking.” 
       (EEAS 2015: EUTM Factsheet) 
 
While the EU’s acknowledge that its own strategic interests in the form of energy 
supply and fight against trafficking are at stake, it is also emphasised that the mission 
is carried out in order to ensure the long-term stability in Mali. It is explicitly 
presented as a partnership, wherein acting on security threats is not only advantageous 
for the EU:    
 
”The Mission is a significant part of EU’s approach to restore the state’s 
authority throughout Mali and bring a durable solution to the current crisis: 
The restoration of lasting peace in Mali is essential for the long term stability 
of the country and the Sahel region, and in a broader sense for both Africa and 
Europe. ” 
(EEAS 2015: EUTM FACTSHEET)  
 
Moreover, the two above quotes are insightful as to what kind of development project 
the EU is presenting in the discourse. Notably, the notion of underdevelopment as 
dangerous is implicit in the above quote and it infringes directly with EU’s strategic 
interest. This is significant, because it conveys a message that the instability in Mali is 
a common threat for all that needs to be addressed, which in turn endorses an image 
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of the EU as acting as a ‘force for good’, since it will provide stability. Seen as such, 
the EU is presenting a development project in which the enactment of EU’s security 
interests is the same as the long-term development in Mali. It also points to the idea 
that acting on security threats is a form of partnership, since the threat is a common 
goal. However, at this point it is worthwhile mentioning that the security dimension of 
the EU mission has been enhanced over the years and the EUTM mission has been 
stated to be particularly important in providing long-term stability and sustainable in 
Mali (EEAS 2016). The reason for this is the statement that long-term development is 
not possible without security (Council Conclusion May 2013; Council Conclusion 
April 2015). Considering the prominence given to the EUTM mission to provide 
long-term stability and development in Mali, the mandates to do so are notably short-
term in nature and have been extended at least three times: at present the mission is 
mandated to operate until May 2018 (EEAS 2016). As such, this questions the stated 
commitment to long-term stability, and it also has consequences for the partnership 
between the EU and the Malian army. Interviews conducted with European military 
personnel, which I have obtained through secondary sources, revealed a widespread 
dissatisfaction with the short-term nature of the mandates, as it hindered both the 
work of providing long-term stability in the country and minimized prolonged 
engagement with the Malian security forces (Andersson and Weigand 2015:528). In 
addition, Human Rights Watch (2016) claim that a variety of international actors, 
including the EU, have been more concerned with obtaining security objectives and 
gains in Mali, which has been paralleled by little progress in security sector and 
justice reform, despite a promise to do so in the mandate.  
 
Selective Partnerships 
In upholding a partnership with the national security forces, other forms of 
development in Mali have been disregarded. Most notably, this concerns EU’s 
selective condemnation of human rights violations in the country. This is worthwhile 
elaborating on since the promotion of human rights is such an important part behind 
the perception of the EU as a force for good in the world (Manners 2002) and is 
constantly referred to in the justification behind the EU involvement.  Several authors 
have in reports and articles stated that human rights violations are a countrywide 
problem (Donini and Scalettaris 2016; Watling and Raymond 2015), yet the EU 
present the abuses as almost exclusively connected to the destabilising situation in the 
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north (Council Conclusion, 16 March 2015). In the EUTM objectives it is stated that 
the EU shall provide provision on International Humanitarian Law, protection of 
civilians and human rights in their collaboration with the national army and security 
forces, but this commitment has not been upheld in practice. Despite an extensive 
documentation on frequent abuses committed by the security forces, including 
extrajudicial of civilians since 2012, these instances have not been investigated 
(Dufka 2016). Rather, the EU have often turned a blind eye to these problems while 
simultaneously condemned the abuses performed by groups in the northern regions.  
Taking the above into consideration, it questions what kind of partnership the 
EU value and it puts the relationship between security interests and development 
goals in a new light. First, from the justification section, I argued that the EU present 
the situation as though the EU is in a partnership with the state of Mali and its 
citizenship to address the issue of underdevelopment to gain stability and 
development. Second, the EU is also in partnership with the Malian security forces, 
which involves addressing security threats in order to provide sustainable 
development. Significantly, the protecting of civilians and human rights is a key 
objective of the mission. Therefore, when the EU does not condemn human rights 
violations committed by their partners in the security forces, it indicates that the EU 
value this partnership more than that of the partnership with Malian citizens and that 
the enactment of security interests is prioritized over development issues. Seen as 
such, we can discern a development project that prioritizes EU’s security interest 
more than the protection of human right, which in turn questions the image of the EU 
acting as a force for good. Moreover, the following statement the EU made prior to 
launching the EUTM mission in Mali can also be challenged:  
 
“The EU will continue to address the needs of the victims of the crisis 
irrespectively of other political or CSDP action. [The EU] will continue to 
advocate for respect for humanitarian principles, for the protection of civilians 
and for unhindered access to population in need.”  
(Council Conclusion, 5 December 2012:9).   
 
In the end, the EU promotes a development project that will not necessarily address 
the need of the victims or protect civilians, but will rather prioritize the protection its 
own security interests. While it is presented as if acting on security threats will bring 
forward stability and development in Mali, concrete forms of development like the 
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protection of human rights are neglected in practice. Additionally, objectives of 
security and development have become blurred in other ways as well. This can be 
seen in how the EU has engaged in development practices and what the engagement 
can be characterized as, which will be addressed in the following section. 
 
Development and Ownership 
Conditional Development 
Development is by and large presented as being under the ownership and 
responsibility of the Malian state, yet it is also clear that the EU can decide what kind 
of development model should unfold. The development programmes that they choose 
to provide funding for is one indication for this, but it can also be discerned from the 
discourse. The consequence is that while it is presented as it is the Malian state that 
can determine what kind of development is best for the country, it is a conditioned 
development that the domestic actors have the responsibility to carry out.  
In the beginning of the engagement, particularly during the years 2012-2013, 
the EU donations was almost exclusively allocated to prepare for the presidential 
elections in 2013, which were stated to guarantee subsequent sustainable development 
and democratic consolidation throughout the country (EEAS 2016). Following the 
election, the EU mobilised development funding to support justice and law 
enforcement, counter-terrorism initiatives as well as the promotion of dialogue and 
reconciliation initiatives and support for efforts to reduce radicalization and violent 
extremism (Davis 2015:271-272). Significantly, the ‘State Building Contract’ from 
2013 can further exemplify the kind of development that EU promotes. The 
programme focuses predominantly on budget support for the Malian state. It aims to 
improve the financial capacity of the government and implement liberalizing policies 
conducive for a market economy (ECDPM 2013).  This is presented as vital in order 
to foster development and democratic governance and while the EU state that their 
role is primarily to support, it is anyway the EU that decides that this development is 
best suited to provide stability in Mali  
Moreover, the development funding that the EU provide for is being stated as 
being under the ownership of Mali, but the possibility of external ‘intervention’ is 
always present. In the factsheet on the Sahel Strategy, the EU state that development 
will be carried out under the full ownership and primary responsibility of the Sahel 
countries whilst also presenting the kind of development in mind:  
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“The EU is implementing development programmes aimed at strengthening 
resilience, improving the functioning of regional markets and increase the 
regional and national capacity to reduce the risks of disasters.” 
 
[…] the EU continues to support inclusive socio-economic development, 
stability, building state capacity, governance, justice, fight against corruption 
and impunity, and regional integration including social services, especially 
health and education, resilience, sustainable agriculture rural development, 
food and nutrition security, infrastructure and private sector development.” 
(EEAS; Factsheet on the Sahel Strategy). 
 
 
The statements are noteworthy for two reasons. First, it stipulates what kind of 
development the EU endorse, which should both increase resilience and strengthen 
regional markets as to avoid problems of instability and instead produce good 
governance and socioeconomic development. This form of development includes both 
enhancing state capacity, rule of law and private sector development in order to 
promote stability. Second, it is also stated that this development will be implemented 
under full ownership of the countries, which is written in conjunction with “primary” 
responsibility. This leaves open the possibility that other actors than the Sahel states 
can intervene in the countries if they feel it is necessary, which in turn would 
seemingly legitimise external engagement. Seen as such, ownership and primary 
responsibility seems at odd with each other, as the EU not only condition the 
development, they also have the possibility to intervene in Malian development 
affairs at its behest.  
 
Bunkered Presence 
In practice this Malian ownership of development has resulted in aid programmes 
being externally conditioned and locally implemented, leading some to label it as a 
‘donor-driven ownership’ (Bergamaschi 2014; Davis 2015).  This is because 
international development funding has predominantly been allocated to state 
authorities in Bamako with the aim of enhancing state structures. This in turn has 
been paralleled by limited provision of welfare and social services to the population, 
particularly in the northern regions. While international donors are present on the 
ground in Mali, their involvement in the provision of aid is usually limited and more 
geared towards administrative tasks (Donini and Scalettaris 2016). While the EU has 
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provided staff towards their development programmes and some aid agencies, a clear 
division of labour between the EU staff and local workers also distinguishes these 
programmes, as the latter almost exclusively manned the operations of the agencies in 
the north (Andersson and Weigand 2015:531). In addition, from 2012 and onwards 
the EU begun evacuating their staff from the north and suspended their projects or 
supervised them from headquarters in Bamako, due to the stated prevalence of 
security threats, issues of cost-effectiveness and institutional obstacles (Bergamaschi 
2014:354). These instances all have an effect on what kind of development project 
that the EU promotes in Mali.  Specifically, it reflects a current trend in which aid and 
development programmes have become increasingly militarised and securitized. This 
in turn is manifested in the bunkerization of aid agencies and remote management on 
behalf of international donors, notably also the EU.  
 One notable finding from the research and fieldwork conducted by Donini and 
Scalettaris (2016) on the work and progress of aid and humanitarian agencies 
operating in Mali concerned the extent to which large agencies and donor presence 
are losing their field craft and are less and less operational (2016:16). In addition, aid 
agencies have to spend more time and effort on responding to the conditions and 
requirements of donors than providing development service to people in affected 
regions. They argue that the point for local actors and offices in the field is not only to 
do something meaningful on the ground, but also to be able to demonstrate the 
relevance of what they want to do to potential donors and portray themselves as 
credible actors to obtain funding. This entails developing and devoting increasing 
resources to non-operational activities such as communication, coordination, 
reporting, and demonstrating accountability to headquarters and donors, rather than to 
the people who the development aid is directed towards (Donini and Scalettaris 
2016:16). Significantly, the EU is mentioned as being a prominent part of this 
international donor community operating in Mali, and as such this gives us an 
indication that the EU endorses a development project that is primarily devoted to 
‘upward reporting’ and remote management. Further, this upward orientation is also 
reflected in the proliferation of more sophisticated data and reporting tools, seen in 
increased donor investment in tools as maps and remote sensing (Donini and 
Scalettaris 2016:16-17).  
 Apart from conditioning and managing development programmes at a 
distance, a related trend is that the EU aid agencies in Mali have also become 
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increasingly bunkered up and fortified. As argued by Andersson and Weigand (2015), 
a consequence of this is that risks have become transferred to local actors. This has 
often involved attempts at building a ‘resilient’ aid worker self in combination with 
increased physical bunkering and selective withdrawal (2015:522). During their 
fieldwork, they noted how international agencies were not only predominantly located 
in Bamako, far from the ‘instability and underdevelopment’ in the northern regions, 
they were also surrounded by barbed wire and armed soldiers patrolling the grounds. 
Local and international staff expressed dissatisfaction with this situation, as the 
bunkering and partial withdrawal in the field led to significant gaps in the 
international presence across Malian territory  (Andersson and Weigand 2015:522).  
 Consequently, development is presented as if it is under the full ownership of 
Mali, but it is questionable what kind of ownership we can talk about. The reason 
being that EU conditions the kind of development to unfold, which is a development 
project primarily aimed towards enhancing state structures and make the state 
conducive to liberalizing economies and open to regional markets. Moreover, the EU 
also has the possibility to intervene in internal matters.  Local actors have been 
assigned the responsibility to carry out development projects prescribed by the EU, 
whilst remote management and bunkerization characterize the EU presence on the 
ground. Seen as such, we can discern a development project in which the EU can 
decide the content and outcome of development whilst remaining at a safe distance 
from the problems of underdevelopment.  
 
 
Conclusion: What kind of development project?  
 
Throughout its involvement in Mali, the EU has constantly emphasised that it aims to 
provide sustainable development and long-term stability in Mali and has in so doing 
also presented it as beneficial for the country and the people within it. The 
understanding that security and development can only be achieved together is 
significant in this respect as it serves as a guiding principle for the mission and 
informs all subsequent EU action in Mali. However, the use of security-development 
nexus in this way can also tell another story that runs counter to the EU’s self-
presentation as a force for good.  As stated in the framework, the use and presentation 
of the security-development nexus explains what constitutes a security threat and 
where it is located, it prescribes what the solution to the threat is and it stipulates who 
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can do what in the name of security and development, all of which we can also 
discern in the EU discourse and practices concerning the mission in Mali. 
First, the notion of ‘underdevelopment as dangerous’ frames the 
understanding of the situation in Mali and it is presented as a security threat for 
virtually everyone. This legitimises EU involvement whilst also internalising the root 
causes of underdevelopment and poverty. As such, we are told that the problem is 
located in Mali and it is the EU that can provide a solution to the problem: in a self-
enhancing manner the EU presents itself as indispensable in Mali, where it can act as 
both a model to follow and as catalyst to implement the necessary change that is in 
line with liberal values of enhancing democratic governance. 
Second, the EU constantly refers to both instances of ‘partnership’ and 
‘ownership’ in justifying and motivating both security and development practices, but 
I argue that we should question what kind of partnership and ownership is at stake. 
The EU state that they are in a partnership with Mali and its citizens to provide 
sustainable development but they are also in a partnership with the national army and 
security forces to address security issues in order to bring forth stability. In effect, the 
EU endorses a selective partnership that values security interests over promotion of 
development, which is exemplified by the non-condemnation of human rights 
violations by the national army and security forces. As such, the EU presents a 
development project that will not necessarily address the need of the victims or 
protect civilians, but will rather prioritize the protection of its own security interests. 
Moreover, the EU also promotes a conditional ownership of development oriented 
towards the creation of liberal democracies. Local actors have been assigned the 
responsibility to carry out development projects prescribed by the EU, whereas the 
EU presence in Mali is primarily characterized by remote management and 
bunkerization of its aid agencies. Consequently, this results in a selective engagement 
on behalf of the EU that values its own security interests over the promotion and 
delivery of development for the Malian citizens. It is a development project in which 
the EU can decide the content and outcome of development whilst remaining at a safe 
distance from the problems of underdevelopment. Ultimately, the EU promotes a 
development project that is more beneficial for the EU than for the state of Mali and 
the Malians. 
My findings are first and foremost based on the discourse as seen in the 
official EU documents, whereas the arguments I made with regards to the facts on the 
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ground have been based on secondary sources. Seen as such, future research on this 
topic should focus on fieldwork, both observations and conduct interviews with 
relevant actors, to confirm what I have argued for in this article. 
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